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Two major trends are currently observable in the behavioural patterns of
Moldova’s population:
• Public support of the EU and its policies (EaP) has slightly eroded which is
reflected in the respondents’ perceptions, levels of interest, attitudes and
behavioural preferences
• Moldovan respondents signal deep confusion in relation to the values they
associate with their country vis-à-vis those attributed to the EU, and the
Eurasian Customs Union (ECU)
Thematic Block I: Public perceptions of and attitudes to the EU
• Although levels of awareness and frequency of public travel to the EU have
positively grown (+2%) since 2009, which is duly reflected in higher public
cognizance of the EU in terms of its institutional structures, membership and
policies; public interest in the EU (-5%) and levels of trust especially (-23%)
nevertheless demonstrate signs of decline
• There is an increasing discernment that Moldova is being perceived as a
‘laggard’ (+7%), and a ‘second-class’ partner (+5%), as well as an unlawful
(+17%) and feeble democracy (+4%).
• Although the EU continues to associate with the feelings of ‘faith’ (+10%) and
‘enthusiasm’ (+4%), there is also a noticeable rise in public ‘distrust’ and
‘anxiety’ (+15%), alongside ‘indifference’ (+3%) and the loss of ‘hope’ (-4%)
since 2009
Thematic Block II: Moldova-EU relations under the EaP: perceptions,
values and ambitions
• There is a general sense of stagnation in EU-Moldovan relations depicted
as ‘more talks than actions’ (+2%) in public discourse. Furthermore, the 
EU-Moldovan relations under the EaP are now conceived as corresponding
more to the interests of the EU rather than those of Moldova (+13%)
• This is further reinforced by the increasingly negative anticipation of change
under the EaP associated with deteriorating living conditions, growing pressure
from Russia, costly reforms, political uncertainty, and limited change in practice.
• There is a growing sense of normative disorientation amongst the Moldovan
respondents: while the EU continues to associate with a fixed set of liberal
values, the perceptions of ‘the Self’ have markedly eroded, with every third
respondent struggling to attribute any definitive connotation of values to their
own country
Thematic Block III: Moldova-Russia relations, including perceptions
of/attitudes to the ECU
• Levels of awareness about the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) are relatively
high (85%), and many respondents see the ECU as equally effective as the
EU in addressing immediate pressing problems of economic reforms, trade
relations and employment in Moldova
• The ECU is also associated with a hybrid normative model of ‘social
democracy’, which offers a mix of liberal and socialist (egalitarian) values,
and which may be more appealing to the public mind. An increasing number
of respondents believe that partnership with Russia would be more beneficial for
Moldova (+3%) than that with the EU (-14%); and they would rather
choose membership in a Russia-led union (+15%) to that in the EU (-1%)
• There is an actualising sense of rivalry between the ECU and the EU, with
public opinion explicitly divided between the two regional power centres
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Thematic Block I: Public
perceptions of and
attitudes to the EU
A temporal analysis of  public
surveys undertaken by the PI in
2009 and 2013 points to a gradual
erosion of  public preferences for
and positive perceptions of  the EU
during the four-year period.
There are two noticeable trends in
particular. On the one hand, the
levels of  public awareness about
the EU as a polity, have positively
grown (98%, +2) to facilitate a more
discernible understanding of  EU
structures, institutions and policies.
Respondents display high levels of
cognizance of  the EU as
organisation (71%); and its policies:
every sixth respondent could
correctly identify partner countries
under the EaP, and their variable
levels of  engagement with the EU;
every second respondent is aware
about the Association Agreement
(50%), which the EU and Moldova
have now initialled; and every third
had heard about the
Neighbourhood Policy (40%; +7)
and the DCFTA (35%). A third
(36%) of  those who had heard
about the DCFTA, define it as a
‘process of  trade liberalisation’.
At the same time, the respondents
seem to be less interested in the EU
(67%; -5) as juxtaposed with a
higher degree of  attention to
Moldova-Russian relations (80%;
+4). Many point to the general
decline in EU relations with the
region (59%; -20); however the EU-
Moldovan relations continue to be
viewed as stable (69%; +2). The
importance of  the EU as a partner
retains its value (64%), which is
nevertheless similar to the
perception of  the importance of
partnership with the ECU (62%).
The ECU however leads in the
perception of  shared values which
the respondents believe to be part
of  the relationship with the ECU and
the EU respectively (62% vs. 44%).
A lingering sense of  disillusionment
is beginning to manifest in the
perceptions of  the EU: although the
majority is still positively
predisposed to the EU (65%), this
view has nevertheless declined by
14% since 2009, concomitant with a
9% rise in negative feelings. The
EU-Moldovan relations are
increasingly viewed as favouring
more EU interests (35%; +14) than
those of  Moldova (25%; -9%).
There is an increasing discernment
that Moldova is being perceived as
a ‘laggard’ (45%; +7); ‘dependent’
(46%; +4); ‘undemocratic’ (34%;
+4); ‘unlawful’ (52%; +17) and
‘weak’ (82%; +4) country.
Furthermore a greater share of  the
respondents now believe that
Moldovans are treated as ‘second-
class’ citizens (43%; +6), which in
conjunction with the growing
number of  those who are no longer
convinced that relations with the EU
serve Moldovan interests, form
strong foundations for the rise of
euroscepticism.
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Temporal comparison of  public
normative beliefs indicates no
change in value patterns
associated with the EU and the
Russia-led ECU. In particular, the
EU is determinedly associated with
a liberal democracy model (Kurki
2010:372), premised on the values
of  democracy, human rights, lack of
corruption, and market economy.
As cross-comparison between 2009
and 2013 indicates, this model is
rather enduring. A model the
respondents come to associate with
the ECU, offers a mix of  qualities, a
hybrid case, which could be
referred to as a social democratic
model (Ibid: 373). Normative
confusion emerges amongst the
respondents in relation to the values
they attribute to their own country. If
in 2009 the model was relatively
clear, referring mainly to the values
of  peace (51%); democracy (34%),
respect for different religions and
cultures (25%), tolerance (24%),
and human rights (23%); by 2013
public normative associations have
become significantly eroded. Every
fifth respondent (21%) fails to
identify any definitive set of  values
with their own country; and every
sixth rejects all listed values
altogether! There is some reference
to peace/stability (20%; -31) and
democracy (16%; -18), as well as
tolerance and culture (11%; -9)
which have significantly eroded
since 2009:




• democracy (46%; -11)
• human rights (41%; -8)
• lack of  corruption (32%)
• market economy (31%; -18)
• peace/stability (30%; -10)
Hybrid case (ECU)
• market mconomy (28%)
• peace/stability (26%)
• economic prosperity (20%)
• lack of  corruption (18%)
• security (16%)
Confused case (MD)
• don’t know (21%; +10)
• peace/stability (20%; -31)
• none of  the above (16%; -11)
• democracy (15.8%; -18)
• tolerance/culture (11%; -8)
Source: PI
In summary, although the EU-
Moldova relations under the EaP are
still regarded as stable, there is a
noticeable decline in public trust
and legitimation of  the EU policies,
expressly perceived as being
driven by the EU interests and
implicating negative consequences
for the country. The values gap
between the EU and Moldova
persists, this time however
signalling an erosion of  the ‘Self’-
identity. This implies a process of
change and social re-engineering
of  norms and values of  the
individuals which presently struggle
to collectively summarise their
identity. This is a formative process,
which could take any directions,
and which at the same time, points
to the window of  opportunity for the
external actors to contribute to








Although the respondents generally
retain their preferential attitudes
towards the EU, Russia and the
ECU nevertheless continue to
garner substantial public support in
the country.
Despite being newly launched
(2010), the ECU commands a
relatively high levels of  awareness
(85%) and interest (67%), being
further reinforced by 80% interest in
Russia as well. The majority of  the
respondents see the ECU as
equally effective as the EU in
addressing some pressing issues
of  trade, economic reforms and
employment in the country. Both the
EU (64%) and the ECU (62%) are
competing to be perceived as
important strategic partners in the
eyes of  the respondents.
The differences become apparent
when the two regional powers are
juxtaposed. In particular, although
the overwhelming majority of  the
respondents believe that the
Transdnistrian conflict is an
obstacle for Moldova’s reforms, with
less than a third being convinced
that the EU and Russia could work
Although the EU continues to
associate with the feelings of  ‘faith’
(22%; +10) and ‘enthusiasm’ (14%;
+4), there is also a noticeable rise in
public ‘distrust’ (20%; +15),
‘anxiety’ (19%; +15), ‘indifference’
(13%; + 3) and loss of  ‘hope’ (47%;
- 4).
In summary, four years on (2009;
2013) public legitimation of  the EU
is dwindling reflecting changes in
the patterns of  public perceptions,
attitudes and behavioural
preferences. Despite the growing
levels of  awareness and intensified
travel to the EU, some signs of
disenchantment begin to surface.
They reflect slowly changing
predispositions towards the EU in
the levels of  interest, trust, emotional
associations and the nature of
partnership with the EU. This points
to a significant shift from where
Moldova was four years ago – an
highly enthusiastic, pioneering and
committed follower of  the EU - to
becoming a rather disillusioned
recipient of  the EU directives, where
only a third of  the respondents
believe that the chosen direction is
the right one to follow.




The afore-mentioned critical trend in
general public attitudes towards the
EU is being further detected when
focusing more specifically the 
EU-Moldovan relations under the




In particular, although respondents
generally note that the EaP
relations continue to be premised
on common political, economic,
security and legal interests (on
average 52%; -3), a gradual loss of
trust in the EU-Moldovan relations
under the EaP is also observable: if
in 2009 84% of  the respondents
believed that the EaP was founded
on mutual trust, by 2013 this
number has fallen to 61% (-23). On
a positive side however, there is a
continued understanding that the
EaP serves both the interests of  the
EU (69%; +10), the Moldovan
government (48%; +10) and its
citizens (42%; +17). In relational
terms, however, as indicated in the
previous section, the interests of
the EU are perceived as
domineering.
This is further reinforced by the
increasingly negative anticipation of
change under the EaP, after
initialling the AA with the EU. On a
positive side, trade with the EU is
expected to grow (62%); which is
however outweighed by a series of
negative concerns including rising
living costs (62%) and respectively,
a rising pressure from Russia
(56%). Opinions become seriously
divided in relation to mobility, which
some believe would increase
(44%), but others anticipate more
EU control and meddling (43%);
education provisions are expected
to improve (49%), which may be
countered by the increasing costs
of  education (38%); economic
prosperity might rise (45%), which
many anticipate may coincide with
rising costs of  reforms and higher
levels of  unemployment (42%);
political stability might be enhanced
(49%), which may be counteracted
by rising uncertainty (37%);
corruption might be reduced (46%),
which some concede is more likely
to take a latent form (41%);
independence of  judiciary might be
achieved (43%), but a similar
proportion of  respondents believe
these reforms would only be ‘on
paper’ and cosmetic (43%); and the
Transdnistrian conflict would not be
resolved (54%).
Current arrangements under the
EaP are seen as ‘more talks than
actions’ (42%: +1), indicating slow
pace of  convergence with the EU
(33%; +3). Economic cooperation
(43%; +16); trade (41%; +23);
student exchange (31%; +14) and
CBC (29%; +10) are regarded as
more effective forms of  cooperation
with the EU. Considering all
negative externalities, 47% of  the
respondents still strongly believe
that by 2015-20 their country will
become a member of  the EU.
There is also a positive correlation
between the issues that the
Moldovan respondents find most
pressing including corruption
(30%); employment/pension
provisions (20%) and living costs
(17%), and where they believe the
EU might help. This is however,
offset by similar expectations from
the ECU, with more weight attached
to trade relations.
8the EU over the ECU (40%). In
relational terms, the preference for
the EU is less clear-cut, as also
indicated in the previous sections.
41% believes that Moldova should
seek membership in the ECU, along
with Ukraine and Armenia.
This is further reflected in public
preferences and support for the
country’s foreign policy. Many
interviewees note that although
balancing between the two regional
powers is a preferred option (31%),
this may not be sustainable. A
steady proportion (46%) of  the
respondents approves of  their
country’s foreign policy; however, a
slight majority also report their
disagreement with the chosen
direction (54%). These opinions
explicitly underscore internal
disagreements within the society,
signalled by a considerably eroded
sense of  their own identity. They are
also a reflection of  a deeper public
understanding and awareness of
Moldova’s challenges and complex
policy priorities for the future.
In normative terms, the ECU is
being depicted as a polity that
offers a hybrid model of  ‘social
democracy’, which boasts a mix of
liberal and socialist (egalitarian)
values. Premised on such
associations as stability, prosperity
and security (as opposed to
democracy, human rights and
market reforms of  the EU), this
model may garner more legitimation
amongst the Moldovans in the
current vacuum of  normative
qualifiers for their own identity.
In conclusion, the above temporal
comparisons reveal some crucial
changes in public perceptions of
the EU, Russia (including the ECU)
and the Self, as well as behavioural
in partnership to resolve the
conflict. Conversely, a plurality
(37%) of  the respondents insist that
the EU and Russia are rivals in the
eastern region, and would not be
able to jointly offer an
accommodating solution to the
conflict. Partnership with the ECU
(37%) is seen as a slightly more
beneficial for the country to that with
the EU (26%), especially in terms of
ensuring trade and employment.
Furthermore, if  a referendum were
to take place tomorrow, the opinions
within the country would be
seriously divided: 36% (+17) would
support more cooperation with the
ECU; 32% (-1) with the EU; and a
persistent third would prefer
cooperation with both polities.
However, when the respondents
were pressed further to choose
between the adherence to the ECU
or the EU respectively, a slight
majority (44%; -11) would still prefer
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patterns and preferences in
Moldova. Although the EU remains
attractive for Moldova, this is not yet
a default option, which requires
continuous reinforcement: the fear
of  uncertainty and negative
anticipations of  change currently
prevail in public perceptions of  the
EU, causing a loss of  trust, and
reciprocity in EU-Moldova relations.
The ECU, on the contrary, tends to
be seen as a model which may
potentially offer a quick-fix solution
for stability, prosperity and security.
In this context, public opinion is
seriously divided as to the direction
of  and economic priorities for the
country in relation to the EU and the
ECU. The latter is seen as a
significant and legitimate contender
for the EU’s appeal in the country.
This becomes particularly relevant
in the situation of  eroding cultural
identity for the Moldovans, which on
the one hand, signals about
changing normative preferences,
but on the other, renders propitious
grounds for social re-engineering –
an important opportunity requiring
careful but timely and intense
engagement with the public in order





The questionnaire included three
thematic blocks addressing public
perceptions, behavioural patterns
and levels of  awareness about
i The European Union (EU) as a
regional power




including public perceptions of
the Eurasian Customs Union
(ECU)
The findings are compared with a
similar survey undertaken by the
Principal Investigator in January
2009,2 as well as other available
data, including the EU
Neighbourhood Barometer East
(Autumn 2012).3
Documents available on request for
further inspection:
• Completed questionnaires (1000
copies)
• Itinerary lists completed by
interviewers
• Instructions for interviewers and
regional leaders
• Technical report of  the survey
• Questionnaire in English, Russian
and Romanian languages
The sampling was multi-staged,
stratified, and random, and
included 1000 respondents. The
surveyed selection was
representative of  the population
aged 18+ (urban and rural) by
nationality, sex, region, age and
education. The municipality Bender
and surrounding districts on the left
side of  river Dnestr (Transdnistria)
were excluded from the survey,
which approximately amounted to
13% of  the excluded population.
The interviews were face-to-face
and lasted on average 35 minutes
using local languages for
interlocution. The sample
representation error was no more
than + 3%. The survey included
15% random quality control on
completion, undertaken by the
Principal Investigator.
www.kent.ac.uk/politics/gec10
European culture in order to explore
the contemporary policy challenges
to Europe and its nation states.
The GEC is based within the School
of  Politics and International
Relations (SPIR) and at the Brussels
School of  International Studies
(BSIS), University of  Kent.
Slovak Atlantic
Commission (SAC)
The Slovak Atlantic Commission
(SAC), based in Bratislava, Slovakia
is an independent, non-partisan,
non-governmental organization that
has been giving Central Europe a
powerful voice in the foreign policy
debate for the past two decades.





transatlantic cooperation on the
basis of  instrumental values,
particularly democracy, individual
liberty and the rule of  law.
“Widening the European Dialogue
in Moldova” project, implemented
by SAC with the assistance of  its
think tank the Central European
Policy Institute (CEPI), has the
ambition to contribute to the efforts
aimed at increasing public support
for EU integration in Moldova,
particularly utilizing Central
Europe’s recent experience with the
EU integration process. The project
was financially supported by
SlovakAid.
Project Manager: Michal Skala





The Global Europe Centre (GEC) is
a new research centre at the
University of  Kent focusing on
Europe, its member states, and its
place in a changing world. The
Centre brings together leading
international academics from
politics and international relations,
economics, law, business, and
Professor Elena A. Korosteleva (Principal Investigator)
is Director of the Global Europe Centre (Professional
Studies), Jean Monnet Chair in European Studies at
the University of Kent, and a Professorial Visiting
Fellow at the Belarusian State University. Elena’s main
research interests include EU foreign policies,
European External Action Service, European
Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership, EU
governance, democracy promotion and the concepts of
democracy.
A nation-wide representative survey was conducted
between 19 October and 7 November 2013, by
Independent Sociological and Information Service
‘OPINIA’.
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INFORMATION MOLDOVA’S VALUES SURVEY:
A TECHNICAL REPORT1
1 This survey is commissioned by the Slovak
Atlantic Commission, under the leadership of
Michal Skala, MA, for the project ‘Widening
the European Dialogue in Moldova’’ (SAMRS
2013/VP/01/19) financially supported by
SlovakAid. The findings are the copyright of
the University of  Kent: Please cite
accordingly.
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